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Abstract. In the pre-specified peer model for key agreement, it is as-
sumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended communicating
peer when it commences a protocol run. On the other hand, a party in the
post-specified peer model for key agreement does not know the identifier
of its communicating peer at the outset, but learns the identifier during
the protocol run. In this paper we compare the security assurances pro-
vided by the Canetti-Krawczyk security definitions for key agreement in
the pre- and post-specified peer models. We give examples of protocols
that are secure in one model but insecure in the other. We also enhance
the Canetti-Krawczyk security models and definitions to encompass a
class of protocols that are executable and secure in both the pre- and
post-specified peer models.
1 Introduction
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [1] presented the first formal security model and se-
curity definition for key agreement. The model and associated definitions evolved
over the years, culminating in the 2001 work of Canetti and Krawczyk [4] and its
recent extension by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [13]. In all the aforemen-
tioned works, key agreement protocols are analyzed in the so-called pre-specified
peer model wherein it is assumed that a party knows the identifier of its intended
communicating peer when it commences a run of the protocol. That is, it is as-
sumed that the exchange of identifiers, and possibly also the long-term public
keys of the communicating parties, is handled by the application that invokes a
run of the protocol.
In 2002, Canetti and Krawczyk [5] introduced the post-specified peer model
wherein a party is activated to establish a session key knowing only a destination
address (such as the IP address of a server) of the communicating peer, and only
learns the peer’s identifier during the execution of the protocol. According to
[5], this scenario is common in practical settings where the peer’s identifier is
simply unavailable at the outset, or if one party wishes to conceal its identity
from eavesdroppers or active adversaries. The IKE protocols [8,9] (see also [10])
are important examples of key agreement protocols that provide the option of
identity concealment.
In the remainder of this paper we will not consider the identity concealment
attribute of key agreement protocols. We will often shorten ‘pre-specified peer
model’ to ‘pre model’, and ‘post-specified peer model’ to ‘post model’.
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We say that a key agreement protocol designed for one of the pre or post
models is executable in the other model if it can be run in the second model
without requiring any additional message flows (and without making any funda-
mental changes to the protocol description). It is clear that any key agreement
protocol designed for the post model is executable in the pre model. Indeed,
if the peer’s identifier (and long-term public key) is not needed at the start of
the protocol, then the protocol can also be executed given the peer’s identifier.
Canetti and Krawczyk observed that the Σ0 key agreement protocol is secure in
the post model with respect to the security definition given in [5], but not secure
in the pre model with respect to the security definition given in [4]. Hence, even
though any protocol designed for the post model can be executed in the pre
model, security in the post model of [5] does not guarantee security in the pre
model of [4].
In this paper we explore the executability and security in the post model of
key agreement protocols that have been designed for and analyzed in the pre
model. Of course any protocol designed for the pre model can be modified for the
post model by adding message flows which include the identifiers and long-term
public keys of the communicating parties; however such a modification does not
conform to our notion of executability because of the additional message flows.
We provide an example of a key agreement protocol that is secure in the pre
model but is not executable in the post model. We also observe that the HMQV
protocol [11], which has been proven to be secure in the pre model, is executable
in the post model (without the addition of message flows) but not secure unless
additional measures are taken. These examples illustrate the essential differences
between the two models, and highlight the danger of running in the post model
a protocol that has only been analyzed in the pre model.
It is natural then to ask when a protocol secure in one model is executable
and secure in the other model. We identify a class of modifiable key agreement
protocols that have been designed for the pre model but can be executed with
minimal modifications in the post model. This class includes many of the pro-
tocols that have been proposed in the literature including station-to-station [7],
UM [19,16], MQV [15], Boyd-Mao-Paterson [2], HMQV [11], KEA+ [14], NAXOS
[13], CMQV [20] and Okamoto [18]. (See [3] for an extensive list of key establish-
ment protocols.) Such protocols have a hybrid description that combine the spec-
ification for the pre model and the specification of the modified protocol suitable
for the post model. We develop a combined model and associated security defini-
tion that aims to simultaneously capture the security assurances (and more) of
the extended Canetti-Krawczyk pre-specified peer model [13] and the Canetti-
Krawczyk post-specified peer model [5]. The combined model has the feature
that if a hybrid key agreement protocol is proven secure in that model, then its
specializations are guaranteed to be secure when run in the pre and post models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 we provide informal
overviews of the Canetti-Krawczyk pre and post models and security definitions
for key agreement. The differences between the two models are explored in §3.
Protocol P is described in §3.1 as an example of a protocol that is secure in the
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pre model but not executable in the post model. In §3.2 we describe an attack
on HMQV, demonstrating that the protocol is not secure in the post model.
The Σ0 protocol, which is an example of a protocol that is secure in the post
model but insecure in the pre model, is revisited in §3.3. Our combined model
and security definition are presented in §4. The NAXOS-C protocol is presented
in §5 as an example of a protocol that is secure in the combined model.
Notation and Terminology. Let G = 〈g〉 denote a multiplicatively-written
cyclic group of prime order q, and let G∗ = G \ {1}. The Computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G is that computing CDH(U, V ) = guv
is infeasible given U = gu and V = gv where u, v ∈R [1, q − 1]. The Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in G is that distinguishing DH triples
(ga, gb, gab) from random triples (ga, gb, gc) is infeasible. The Gap Diffie-Hellman
(GDH) assumption in G is that the CDH assumption holds even when a CDH
solver is given a DDH oracle that distinguishes DH triples from random triples.
We consider Diffie-Hellman type protocols where the two communicating par-
ties exchange static (long-term) and ephemeral (one-time) public keys. Party
Aˆ’s static private key is an integer a ∈R [1, q − 1], and her corresponding static
public key is A = ga. Similarly, party Bˆ has a static key pair (b, B), and so on.
A certifying authority (CA) issues certificates that binds a party’s identifier to
its static public key. We do not assume that the CA requires parties to prove
possession of their static private keys, but we do insist that the CA verifies that
static public keys belong to G∗. We restrict our attention to protocols where a
party Aˆ called the initiator commences the protocol by selecting an ephemeral
key pair and then sends the ephemeral public key (and possibly other data)
to the second party. In our protocols, the ephemeral private key is either a ran-
domly selected integer x ∈ [1, q−1] or a randomly selected binary string x˜ which
is used together with the static private key to derive an integer x ∈ [1, q − 1],
and the corresponding ephemeral public key is X = gx. Upon receipt of X , the
responder Bˆ selects an ephemeral private key y or y˜ and sends Y = gy (and
possibly other data) to Aˆ. The parties may exchange some additional messages,
after which they compute a session key. We use I and R to denote the constant
strings “initiator” and “responder”.
2 Security Definitions for Key Agreement
We provide overviews of the Canetti-Krawczyk pre- and post-specified peer mod-
els for key agreement and the associated security definitions. For full details and
further explanations refer to [4] and [5].
2.1 Pre-specified Peer Model
Communications take place in a multi-party system, where the parties are iden-
tified by Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, . . .. At any given point in time, a party may be engaged in
multiple instances of the protocol, each called a session. A session is created at
Aˆ via a message containing at least three parameters (Aˆ, Bˆ, s), where Aˆ is the
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session’s owner, Bˆ is the intended peer, and s is a number that is unique among
all sessions owned by Aˆ. (Aˆ uses s to direct incoming messages to the appropriate
session within Aˆ.) Once created, a session is said to be active and maintains a
session state where session-specific short-lived data such as an ephemeral private
key is stored. The session processes incoming messages and produces outgoing
messages. A session may abort without producing a session key, or may complete
by accepting a session key and erasing its session state.
The adversary M, modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine, controls all
communications between parties as well as the activation of sessions. In order
to model the possible leakage of secret information, M is allowed to issue the
following queries to parties:
– SessionStateReveal: M learns the contents of the session state for a (not yet
completed) session of its choosing. The session can no longer be activated
and stops producing output.
– Expire: M directs a completed session to delete its session key.
– SessionKeyReveal: M learns the session key held by a (completed but un-
expired) session of its choosing.
– Corrupt: M learns all the secret information held by a party of its choosing,
including the party’s static private key, all session states, and all session
keys. The party can no longer be activated and stops producing output.
The adversary’s goal is to distinguish a session key from a random key. Ob-
viously the adversary should not be allowed to learn the session key by trivial
means, for example by asking for the session key via a SessionKeyReveal query.
To this end, a session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s) is said to be locally exposed if M issued a Ses-
sionStateReveal or SessionKeyReveal query to that session, or if M issued a
Corrupt query to Aˆ before the session expired (this includes the case in which
Aˆ is corrupted before the session is created). Moreover, the session (Bˆ, Aˆ, s) is
defined to be matching to the session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s), and (Aˆ, Bˆ, s) is said to be unex-
posed if neither this session nor its matching session are locally exposed. Now,
M selects a session that is completed, unexpired, and unexposed, and issues a
special Test query to that session. (M is not allowed to issue the Test query
more than once.) In response, M is given with equal probability either the ses-
sion key held by the test session or a random key. M can continue to issue
queries, however must ensure that the test session remains unexposed. Finally,
M is said to win its distinguishing game (and thereby break the protocol) if
it guesses correctly whether the key is random or not with success probability
significantly greater than 12 . A key agreement protocol is said to be secure (in
the pre-specified peer model) if (i) uncorrupted parties who complete matching
sessions compute the same session key (except with negligible probability); and
(ii) there is no adversary M who wins the distinguishing game.
2.2 Post-specified Peer Model
The Canetti-Krawczyk post-specified peer model and associated security defini-
tion [5] are essentially the same as in the pre model, but there are two important
differences.
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First, a session at Aˆ is created via a message containing (at least) three pa-
rameters (Aˆ, dˆ, s), where dˆ is a destination address to which outgoing messages
should be delivered. That is, party Aˆ does not know the identifier of its peer
when it starts the session. During the course of the protocol run, Aˆ learns the
(alleged) identifier Bˆ of the communicating party; this party is referred to as Aˆ’s
peer for that session.
Second, the definition of a matching session is different. Let (Aˆ, s) be a session
that has completed with peer Bˆ. Then a session (Bˆ, s) is said to be matching to
(Aˆ, s) if either (i) (Bˆ, s) has not yet completed; or (ii) (Bˆ, s) has completed and
its peer is Aˆ. Condition (i) is necessary because the incomplete session (Bˆ, s)
may not yet have determined its peer and hence could have been communicating
with (Aˆ, s), in which case exposure of (Bˆ, s) could possibly reveal non-trivial
information about the session key held by (Aˆ, s).
3 Differences between the Two Models
This section presents three examples to illustrate the differences between the
Canetti-Krawczyk security definitions for key agreement in the pre- and post-
specified peer models. Protocol P is secure in the pre model, but cannot be
executed in the post model. HMQV is an example of a protocol that is secure in
the pre model, and executable but not secure in the post model. The Σ0 protocol
is secure in the post model but insecure in the pre model.
3.1 Protocol P
We present a two-pass Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol P . The protocol
can be proven secure in the pre-specified peer model under the GDH assumption
and where H and H2 are modeled as random functions. (The reductionist secu-
rity argument is elementary but tedious, and hence is omitted.) Observe that the
initiator Aˆ cannot prepare the first outgoing message without knowledge of the
peer’s identifier Bˆ and static public key B. Hence, unless protocol P is modified
in a fundamental way, it cannot be executed in the post-specified peer model
without additional message flows to exchange identifiers and static public keys.
1. On input (Aˆ, Bˆ, s), party Aˆ (the initiator) does the following:
(a) Create an active session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, I).
(b) Select an ephemeral private key x ∈R [1, q − 1].
(c) Compute X = gx and tA = H2(Ba, I, s, Aˆ, Bˆ,X).
(d) Send (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,X, tA) to Bˆ.
2. Upon receiving (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,X, tA), party Bˆ (the responder) does the following:
(a) Create an active session (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,R).
(b) Verify that X ∈ G∗.
(c) Compute σs = Ab and verify that tA = H2(σs, I, s, Aˆ, Bˆ,X).
(d) Select an ephemeral private key y ∈R [1, q − 1].
(e) Compute Y = gy, tB = H2(σs,R, s, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y ), and k = H(Xy, X, Y ).
(f) Destroy y and σs.
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(g) Send (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, I, Y, tB) to Aˆ.
(h) Complete the session (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,R) and accept k as the session key.
3. Upon receiving (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, I, Y, tB), party Aˆ checks that she owns an active
session with identifier (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, I). If so, then Aˆ does the following:
(a) Verify that Y ∈ G∗.
(b) Verify that tB = H2(Ba,R, s, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y ).
(c) Compute k = H(Y x, X, Y ).
(d) Destroy x.
(e) Complete the session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, I) by accepting k as the session key.
3.2 HMQV Protocol
HMQV [11] is an efficient two-pass Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
has been proven to be secure in the pre-specified peer model under the CDH
and KEA1 assumptions and where the hash functions employed are modeled
as random functions.1 The following informal description of the protocol omits
some technical details that are not relevant to our analysis.2
Let H denote a hash function whose outputs are bitstrings of length l, where
l is half the bitlength of the group order q. In HMQV, the initiator Aˆ sends
(Bˆ, Aˆ,X) to Bˆ, who responds with (Aˆ, Bˆ, Y ). Party Aˆ computes the session key
k = H(σA), where σA = (Y Be)x+da and d = H(X, Bˆ) and e = H(Y, Aˆ). Party
Bˆ computes the same session key as k = H(σB), where σB = (XAd)y+eb.
Unlike protocol P , HMQV is executable in the post-specified peer model. In-
deed, the initiator can prepare the first message (which essentially consists of the
ephemeral public key X) without knowledge of the peer’s identifier Bˆ or static
public key B. It is natural then to ask whether HMQV is secure in the post
model. This is also important because the version of HMQV that is being con-
sidered for standardization by the P1363 working group [12] does not mandate
that the protocol be executed in the pre model (i.e., there is no requirement that
the communicating parties possess each other’s identifiers and static public keys
prior to a protocol run), and consequently the protocol may in fact be executed
in the post model in applications where the responder’s identifier is not available
to the initiator at the beginning of the protocol run.
We describe an attack which demonstrates that HMQV (without further mod-
ification such as the addition of message flows to exchange identifiers and static
public keys) is not secure in the post model. The attack makes the following plau-
sible assumptions: (i) the group order q is a 160-bit prime and so the outputs of
H have bitlength 80; (ii) the best attack on the CDH problem in G takes approx-
imately 280 steps; (iii) there are at least 220 honest (i.e., uncorrupted) parties;
(iv) a party can select its own identifier; and (v) the certification authority does
1 The security definition used in [11] is stronger than the security definition outlined
in §2.1 in the sense that the adversary is granted certain additional capabilities.
For example, the adversary is allowed to register a static key pair at any time thus
allowing the modeling of attacks by malicious insiders.
2 In particular, we omit session identifiers and assume that all static and ephemeral
public key are fully validated, i.e., verified as belonging to G∗.
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not require parties to prove knowledge of the static private keys corresponding
to their static public keys during registration.3 The attack proceeds as follows.
1. The adversary M induces Aˆ to create a session with a destination address dˆ
controlled by M. In response, Aˆ selects ephemeral key pair (x,X) and sends
(dˆ, Aˆ,X).
2. M intercepts (dˆ, Aˆ,X) and does the following:
(a) Compute S = {(Cˆ,H(X, Cˆ)) | Cˆ is an honest party}.
(b) Select an identifier Mˆ (not the same as the identifier of an honest party)
such that (Bˆ,H(X, Mˆ)) ∈ S for some Bˆ.
(c) Select M = B as Mˆ ’s static public key (note that M does not know the
corresponding private key).
(d) Send (Bˆ, Aˆ,X) to Bˆ.
3. M intercepts Bˆ’s reply (Aˆ, Bˆ, Y ) and sends (Aˆ, Mˆ, Y ) to Aˆ.
Party Aˆ computes the session key k = H(σA), where σA = (Y Me)x+da and
d = H(X, Mˆ) and e = H(Y, Aˆ). Party Bˆ computes the session key k′ = H(σB),
where σB = (XAd
′
)y+e
′b and d′ = H(X, Bˆ) and e′ = H(Y, Aˆ). Since d′ = d,
e′ = e, and M = B, we have σA = σB and hence k′ = k. The problem is that
while Bˆ correctly believes that k is shared with Aˆ, party Aˆ mistakenly believes
that k is shared with Mˆ . Thus M has successfully launched an ‘unknown key-
share’ or ‘identity misbinding’ attack on HMQV in the post model. The expected
running time of the attack is about 260 (for step 2b). Since most of the work
has to be done online, the attack cannot be considered practical. Nevertheless
it demonstrates that HMQV does not attain an 80-bit security level in the post
model as it presumably does in the pre model.
The mechanisms of the attack were outlined in Remark 7.2 of [11]. However,
the adversary considered in [11] operates in a different setting, namely the pre
model where party Aˆ precomputes and stores her ephemeral public keys X which
are then inadvertently leaked to M before Aˆ uses them in a session. Three coun-
termeasures were proposed in [11] for foiling this attack: (i) increase the output
length of H to 160 bits; (ii) include the identifiers Aˆ, Bˆ in the key derivation
function whereby the session key is computed as k = H(σ, Aˆ, Bˆ); and (iii) in-
clude random nonces (which are not precomputed and stored) in the derivation
of exponents d and e, whereby the exponents are computed as d = H(X, Bˆ, νA)
and e = H(Y, Aˆ, νB) where νA and νB are Aˆ’s and Bˆ’s nonces, respectively.
Countermeasures (i) and (ii) are successful in thwarting the attack described
above on HMQV in the post model. However, it can easily be seen that counter-
measure (iii) does not prevent the attack in the post model, thus demonstrating
that the two attacks are indeed different. The reason countermeasure (iii) fails
is that, unlike in the pre model, the peer’s identifier is not known to Aˆ when she
creates the session in the post model.
3 In [11] it is noted that the HMQV security proof does not depend on the CA per-
forming any proof-of-possession checks.
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3.3 Σ0 Protocol
The Σ0 protocol [5] is a simplified version of one of the IKE key agreement
protocols. In the protocol description below, PRF is a pseudorandom function
family, MAC is a message authentication code algorithm, and sigA and sigB are
the signing algorithms for Aˆ and Bˆ, respectively.
1. Party Aˆ (the initiator) selects an ephemeral key pair (x,X), initializes the
session identifier to (Aˆ, s), and sends (dˆB , dˆA, s,X). Here dˆA and dˆB are
destination addresses for Aˆ and Bˆ, respectively.
2. Upon receipt of (dˆB, dˆA, s,X), Bˆ (the responder) selects an ephemeral key
pair (y, Y ), and computes σ = Xy, k = PRFσ(0), and k′ = PRFσ(1). Bˆ
then destroys y and σ, initializes the session identifier to (Bˆ, s), and sends
m1 = (dˆA, Bˆ, s, Y, sigB(R, s,X, Y ),MACk′ (R, s, Bˆ)).
3. Upon receiving m1, Aˆ computes σ = Y x, k = PRFσ(0), and k′ = PRFσ(1).
Aˆ then verifies the signature and MAC tag in m1, and sends m2 = (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,
sigA(I, s, Y,X),MACk′(I, s, Aˆ)). Finally, Aˆ accepts the session key k with
peer Bˆ, and erases the session state.
4. Upon receiving m2, Bˆ verifies the signature and MAC tag in m2, accepts
the session k with peer Aˆ, and erases the session state.
In [5], the Σ0 protocol is proven secure in the post-specified peer model pro-
vided that the DDH assumption holds in G and that the PRF, MAC, and sig
primitives are secure. However, the following attack described in [5] shows that
Σ0 is not secure in the pre-specified peer model.
1. Create a session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s) at Aˆ.
2. Intercept Aˆ’s outgoing message (Bˆ, Aˆ, s,X) and send (Bˆ, Mˆ, s,X) to Bˆ.
3. Intercept Bˆ’s response (Mˆ, Bˆ, s, Y, SB, tB), where SB = sigB(R, s,X, Y ) and
tB = MACk′(R, s, Bˆ), and send (Aˆ, Bˆ, s, Y, SB, tB) to Aˆ.
4. The session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s) at Aˆ completes and accepts k as the session key.
5. Intercept and delete Aˆ’s final message, and issue a SessionStateReveal query
to the session (Bˆ, Mˆ , s) thus learning k and k′.
6. Issue the Test query to the session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s) and use knowledge of k to win
the distinguishing game.
Notice that the attack is legitimate in the pre-specified peer model since the
exposed session (Bˆ, Mˆ, s) is not matching to the test session (Aˆ, Bˆ, s). On the
other hand, such an attack is not permitted in the post-specified peer model
because in step 5 of the attack the session (Bˆ, s) is still incomplete and therefore
matching to the Test session (and thus cannot be exposed). This is all rather
counterintuitive since one would expect that if a protocol is secure when the
initiator does not have a priori knowledge of the peer’s identifier, then it should
remain secure when the peer’s identifier is known at the outset.
One feature of both the pre and post models is that an exposed session does
not produce any further output. In practice, however, one might desire the as-
surance that a particular session is secure even if the adversary learns some
secret state information (such as an ephemeral private key) associated with that
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session or its matching session. For this reason, the security models in recent
papers such as [11], [13] and [20] permit exposed sessions to continue producing
output, and furthermore allow the adversary to issue a SessionStateReveal query
(or its equivalent) to the Test session and its matching session (cf. §4.3). How-
ever, if the adversary M were equipped with these extra capabilities, then the
Σ0 protocol would be insecure in both the pre and post models since M could
issue a SessionStateReveal query to (Aˆ, s) after step 1 to learn x and thereafter
compute the session key. Furthermore, the Σ0 protocol falls in the post model to
the following analogue of the attack described above. The attack is a little more
realistic than the attack described above in the pre model because we now as-
sume that the SessionStateReveal query does not yield the session key k (which
may be stored in secure memory). M’s actions are the following:
1. Create a session (Aˆ, s) at Aˆ with peer destination address dˆB .
2. Intercept Aˆ’s outgoing message (dˆB , dˆA, s,X) and send (dˆB, dˆM , s,X) to Bˆ.
3. Intercept Bˆ’s response (dˆM , Bˆ, s, Y, SB, tB), where SB = sigB(R, s,X, Y )
and tB = MACk′ (R, s, Bˆ), and send (dˆA, Bˆ, s, Y, SB, tB) to Aˆ.
4. Intercept Aˆ’s final message and delete it. The session (Aˆ, s) completes with
peer Bˆ and session key k.
5. Issue a SessionStateReveal query to the incomplete session (Bˆ, s) and learn
the MAC key k′.
6. Compute SM = sigM (I, s, Y,X) and tM = MACk′ (I, s, Mˆ), and send
(Bˆ, Mˆ , s, SM , tM ) to Bˆ.
The session (Bˆ, s) completes with peer Mˆ and session key k. Thus M has suc-
cessfully launched an unknown key-share attack on Σ0 in the post model. The
two attacks demonstrate that a protocol proven secure in the post-specified peer
model of [5] may no longer be secure if exposed sessions are allowed to continue
producing output.
4 Combining the Two Models
In this section we introduce the notion of a modifiable key agreement protocol
— protocols designed for the pre-specified peer model but which can be adapted
with minor changes to be executable in the post-specified peer model. We also
introduce the notion of a hybrid key agreement protocol, which simultaneously
describes a modifiable protocol and its modification suitable for the post model.
We then develop a security definition that, if satisfied by a hybrid protocol,
guarantees that the associated protocols are secure in the pre and post models.
4.1 Modifiable Protocols
Consider a key agreement protocol Π designed for the pre model where the first
outgoing message prepared by the initiator Aˆ is of the form (Bˆ, Aˆ,RoundOne).
Then Π is said to be modifiable if RoundOne can be computed before the session
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is created at Aˆ; in particular, this means that RoundOne does not depend on
Bˆ’s identifier or static public key.
A modifiable protocol Π can be easily adapted for the post-specified peer
model by incorporating identity establishment into the protocol flows. The re-
quired changes are the following. The initiator Aˆ, who is activated to create a
session with a destination address dˆ (and without knowledge of the recipient’s
identifier or static public key), sends (dˆ, Aˆ,RoundOne) as her first outgoing mes-
sage. Since this message contains the identifier Aˆ, the responder has all the in-
formation he needs to prepare his first outgoing message as specified by Π . The
responder appends his identifier to this outgoing message (if the message does
not already contain the identifier). After Aˆ receives this reply, both Aˆ and the
responder can proceed with Π without any further modifications. Notice that
the modified protocol Π ′ has the same number of message flows as the original
protocol Π ; except for appending a public value to the first outgoing message,
the remainder of the protocol remains the same.
As mentioned in §1, the class of modifiable key agreement protocols includes
many of the protocols that have been proposed in the literature. However, not
all key agreement protocols are modifiable; for example, protocol P defined in
§3.1 is not modifiable. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the attack on HMQV
in §3.2, security of a modifiable protocol Π in the pre model does not imply
security of the modified protocol Π ′ in the post model.
4.2 Hybrid Protocols
Suppose that Π is a modifiable key agreement protocol, and Π ′ its modification
suitable for the post model. The specification of Π and Π ′ can be combined as
described below, resulting in a protocol Π˜ called a hybrid protocol.
We use A˜ to denote either an identifier Aˆ or a destination address dˆ that can
be used to send messages to some party Aˆ whose identifier is not known to the
sender; note that the address dˆ may not necessarily be under Aˆ’s control. In the
description of Π˜ , a session is created at initiator Aˆ via a message containing
(Aˆ, B˜). The first outgoing message from Aˆ is (B˜, Aˆ,RoundOne). The responder
Bˆ includes the identifiers Aˆ and Bˆ in his response, and the remainder of the
protocol description is the same as for Π .
A hybrid protocol Π˜ can be specialized for the pre model by using an identifier
Bˆ for B˜. Protocol Π˜ can also be specialized for the post model by using a
destination address for B˜. An example of a hybrid protocol is given in §5.
4.3 Combined Security Model
This section describes a “combined” model and associated security definition
that aims to simultaneously capture the security assurances of the pre- and
post-specified peer models. That is, if a hybrid protocol Π˜ is proven secure with
respect to the new definition, then its specializations Π and Π ′ are guaranteed
to be secure when run in the pre and post models, respectively. More precisely,
when run in the pre model, Π satisfies the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK)
definition [13] suitably enhanced to capture attacks where an adversary is able to
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learn ephemeral public keys of parties before they are actually used in a protocol
session.4 Such attacks were considered by Krawczyk [11], but were not incorpo-
rated into his security model. When run in the post model, the modified protocol
Π ′ satisfies a strengthened version of the Canetti-Krawczyk definition from [5],
suitably enhanced to offer security assurances similar to the eCK definition (in-
cluding resistance to attacks where the adversary learns ephemeral private keys
of the session being attacked) and to capture attacks where the adversary learns
ephemeral public keys before they are actually used.
Instead of using pre-determined session numbers s to identify sessions (cf.
§2.1), our session identifiers will consist of the identities of the communicating
parties together with a concatenation of the messages exchanged during a proto-
col run. As shown in [6], this notion of session identifier yields a security model
for key agreement that is at least as strong as other security models.
Notation. We assume that messages are represented as binary strings. If m is a
vector then#m denotes the number of its components.We say that two vectorsm1
and m2 are matched, written m1 ∼ m2, if the first t = min{#m1,#m2} compo-
nents of the vectors are pairwise equal as binary strings. We write Aˆ ≡ D˜ if either
D˜ = Aˆ or if D˜ is a destination address that can be used to send messages to Aˆ.
Session Creation. A party Aˆ can be activated via an incoming message to
create a session. The incoming message has one of the following forms: (i) (Aˆ, B˜)
or (ii) (A˜, Bˆ, In). If Aˆ was activated with (Aˆ, B˜) then Aˆ is the session initiator;
otherwise Aˆ is the session responder.
Session Initiator. If Aˆ is the session initiator then Aˆ creates a separate session
state where session-specific short-lived data is stored, and prepares a reply Out
that includes an ephemeral public key X . The session is labeled active and iden-
tified via a (temporary and incomplete) session identifier s = (Aˆ, B˜, I,Comm)
where Comm is initialized to Out. The outgoing message is (B˜, Aˆ,Out).
Session Responder. If Aˆ is the session responder then Aˆ creates a separate
session state and prepares a reply Out that includes an ephemeral public key
X . The session is labeled active and identified via a (temporary and incomplete)
session identifier s = (Aˆ, Bˆ,R,Comm) where Comm = (In,Out). The outgoing
message is (Bˆ, Aˆ, I, In,Out).
Session Update. A party Aˆ can be activated to update a session via an incom-
ing message of the form (Aˆ, Bˆ, role,Comm, In), where role ∈ {I,R}. Upon re-
ceipt of this message, Aˆ checks that she owns an active session with identifier s =
(Aˆ, Bˆ, role,Comm) or s = (Aˆ, dˆ, role,Comm) where dˆ is a destination address;
except with negligible probability, Aˆ can own at most one such session. If no such
session exists then the message is rejected. If a session s = (Aˆ, dˆ, role,Comm)
or s = (Aˆ, Bˆ, role,Comm) exists, then in the former case Aˆ updates the session
4 As discussed in [11], such attacks may be possible in situations where a party pre-
computes ephemeral public keys in order to improve on-line performance.
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identifier to s = (Aˆ, Bˆ, role,Comm); in either case, Aˆ updates s by appending In
to Comm. If the protocol requires a response by Aˆ, then Aˆ prepares the required
response Out; the outgoing message is (Bˆ, Aˆ, role,Comm,Out) where role is Bˆ’s
role as perceived by Aˆ, and the session identifier is updated by appending Out to
Comm. If the protocol specifies that no further messages will be received, then
the session completes and accepts a session key.
Matching Sessions. Since ephemeral public keys are selected at random on a
per-session basis, session identifiers are unique except with negligible probability.
Party Aˆ is said to be the owner of a session (Aˆ, B˜, ∗, ∗). For a session (Aˆ, Bˆ, ∗, ∗)
we call Bˆ the session peer ; together Aˆ and Bˆ are referred to as the communicating
parties. Let s = (Aˆ, B˜, roleA,CommA) be a session owned by Aˆ, where roleA ∈
{I,R}. A session s∗ = (Cˆ, D˜, roleC ,CommC), where roleC ∈ {I,R}, is said to
be matching to s if Cˆ ≡ B˜, Aˆ ≡ D˜, roleA = roleC , and CommC ∼ CommA. It
can be seen that the session s, except with negligible probability, can have more
than one matching session if and only if CommA has exactly one component,
i.e., is comprised of a single outgoing message.
Aborted Sessions. A protocol may require parties to perform some checks on
incoming messages. For example, a party may be required to perform some form
of public key validation or verify a signature. If a party is activated to create a
session with an incoming message that does not meet the protocol specifications,
then that message is rejected and no session is created. If a party is activated
to update an active session with an incoming message that does not meet the
protocol specifications, then the party deletes all information specific to that
session (including the session state and the session key if it has been computed)
and aborts the session; such an abortion occurs before the session identifier can
be updated. At any point in time a session is in exactly one of the following
states: active, completed, aborted.
Adversary. The adversary M is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine
and controls all communications. In particular, this means that Aˆ ≡ dˆ for all
parties Aˆ and all destination addresses dˆ. Parties submit outgoing messages to
M, who makes decisions about their delivery. The adversary presents parties
with incoming messages via Send(message), thereby controlling the activation
of parties. The adversary does not have immediate access to a party’s private
information, however in order to capture possible leakage of private information
M is allowed to make the following queries:
– StaticKeyReveal(Aˆ): M obtains Aˆ’s static private key.
– EphemeralKeyReveal(s): M obtains the ephemeral private key held by ses-
sion s.5 We will henceforth assume that M issues this query only to sessions
that hold an ephemeral private key.
5 The EphemeralKeyReveal query can be made functionally equivalent to the Session-
StateReveal query by defining the ephemeral private key to consist of all ephemeral
secret data that a session may hold.
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– SessionKeyReveal(s): If s has completed thenM obtains the session key held
by s. We will henceforth assume that M issues this query only to sessions
that have completed.
– EphemeralPublicKeyReveal(Aˆ): M obtains the ephemeral public key that
Aˆ will use the next time a session is created within Aˆ.
– EstablishParty(Aˆ, A): This query allows M to register an identifier Aˆ and a
static public key A on behalf of a party. The adversary totally controls that
party, thus permitting the modeling of attacks by malicious insiders. Parties
that were established by M using EstablishParty are called corrupted or
adversary controlled. If a party is not corrupted it is said to be honest.
Adversary Goal. To capture the indistinguishability requirement, M is al-
lowed to make a special query Test(s) to a ‘fresh’ session s. In response, M is
given with equal probability either the session key held by s or a random key.
M meets its goal if it guesses correctly whether the key is random or not. Note
that M can continue interacting with the parties after issuing the Test query,
but must ensure that the test session remains fresh throughoutM’s experiment.
Definition 1. Let s be the identifier of a completed session, owned by an honest
party Aˆ with peer Bˆ, who is also honest. Let s∗ be the identifier of the matching
session of s, if it exists. Define s to be fresh if none of the following conditions
hold:
1. M issued SessionKeyReveal(s) or SessionKeyReveal(s∗) (if s∗ exists).
2. s∗ exists and M issued one of the following:
(a) Both StaticKeyReveal(Aˆ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s).
(b) Both StaticKeyReveal(Bˆ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s∗).
3. s∗ does not exist and M issued one of the following:
(a) Both StaticKeyReveal(Aˆ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s).
(b) StaticKeyReveal(Bˆ).
Definition 2. A key agreement protocol is secure if the following conditions
hold:
1. If two honest parties complete matching sessions then, except with negligible
probability, they both compute the same session key.
2. No polynomially bounded adversary M can distinguish the session key of a
fresh session from a randomly chosen session key, with probability greater
than 12 plus a negligible fraction.
5 NAXOS-C Protocol
In this section we present the hybrid version of the NAXOS-C key agreement
protocol, which is essentially the NAXOS protocol of [13] augmented with key
confirmation. In the protocol description, λ is the security parameters, and H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → [1, q − 1], and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
are hash functions. NAXOS-C can be specialized to run in either the pre or the
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post model. Moreover, it can be proven secure in the combined model of §4.3
provided that the GDH assumption holds in G and that the hash functions H ,
H1 and H2 are modeled as random functions; a reductionist security argument
can be found in the full version of this paper [17]. Hence NAXOS-C is secure in
both the pre- and post-specified peer models.
The purpose of presenting the NAXOS-C protocol is to demonstrate that the
security definition of §4.3 is useful (and not too restrictive) in the sense that there
exist practical protocols that meet the definition under reasonable assumptions.
The protocol was designed to allow a straightforward (albeit tedious) reduction-
ist security argument, and has not been optimized. In particular, not all the
inputs to the hash functions H , H1 and H2 may be necessary for security, and
in practice H2 would be implemented as a MAC algorithm (with secret key k′).
1. Party Aˆ (the initiator) does the following:
(a) Select an ephemeral private key x˜ ∈R {0, 1}λ, and compute x = H1(a, x˜)
and X = gx.
(b) Destroy x.
(c) Initialize the session identifier to (Aˆ, B˜, I, X).
(d) Send (B˜, Aˆ,X) to B˜.
2. Upon receiving (B˜, Aˆ,X), party Bˆ (the responder) does the following:
(a) Verify that X ∈ G∗.
(b) Select an ephemeral private key y˜ ∈R {0, 1}λ, and compute y = H1(b, y˜)
and Y = gy.
(c) Compute σ1 = Ay, σ2 = Xb and σe = Xy.
(d) Compute (k, k′)=H(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y, σ1, σ2, σe) and tB =H2(k′,R,Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X).
(e) Destroy y˜, y, σ1, σ2 and σe.
(f) Initialize the session identifier to (Bˆ, Aˆ,R, X, Y, tB).
(g) Send (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y, tB) to Aˆ.
3. Upon receiving (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y, tB), party Aˆ checks that she owns an active ses-
sion with identifier (Aˆ, B˜, I, X). If so, then Aˆ does the following:
(a) Verify that Y ∈ G∗.
(b) Compute x = H1(a, x˜), σ1 = Y a, σ2 = Bx and σe = Y x.
(c) Compute (k, k′) = H(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y, σ1, σ2, σe).
(d) Destroy x˜, x, σ1, σ2 and σe.
(e) Verify that tB = H2(k′,R, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X).
(f) Compute tA = H2(k′, I, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
(g) Destroy k′.
(h) Send (Bˆ, Aˆ,X, Y, tB, tA) to Bˆ.
(i) Update the session identifier to (Aˆ, Bˆ, I, X, Y, tB, tA) and complete the
session by accepting k as the session key.
4. Upon receiving (Bˆ, Aˆ,X, Y, tB, tA), party Bˆ checks that he owns an active
session with identifier (Bˆ, Aˆ,R, X, Y, tB). If so, then Bˆ does the following:
(a) Verify that tA = H2(k′, I, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
(b) Destroy k′.
(c) Update the session identifier to (Bˆ, Aˆ,R, X, Y, tB, tA) and complete the
session by accepting k as the session key.
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6 Conclusions
We compared the Canetti-Krawczyk pre- and post-specified peer models for key
agreement, and demonstrated that security in one model does not guarantee se-
curity or even executability in the other model. We also presented a combined
security model and definition that simultaneously encompasses strengthened ver-
sions of the Canetti-Krawczyk definitions. The new definition is stronger in that
it permits the adversary to learn ephemeral public keys before they are used, and
to learn secret information from the session being attacked. Useful directions for
future research would be the development of an optimized protocol that satisfies
the new security definition, perhaps modified to allow for identity concealment,
and the extension of the definition to capture a wider class of key agreement
protocols.
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